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ABSTRACT  
 
 Federal sentencing law is widely applied to punish offenders not only for the 
offenses of which they have been convicted, but also, in the same proceeding, for offenses 
of which they have not been convicted.  Unlike many scholars, we accept that federal 
courts can, in the right circumstances, legitimately enhance sentences for facts and 
conduct found at sentencing, even when those facts and conduct constitute uncharged 
offenses or even charges on which the defendant actually won an acquittal.  But we 
argue that in identifiable cases, the use of such sentencing facts does cross the line from 
appropriate contextualization of the offense of conviction to punishment for a separate 
offense of which the defendant has never been convicted.  We demonstrate that crossing 
this line contravenes the Sentencing Reform Act, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 
and the Constitution. We then offer a principle and a mode of analysis for ensuring 
that courts punish only for offenses of conviction, even as they do substantial fact-
finding at sentencing.  We examine cases of federal sentencing for second-degree murder 
to explain how this principle works and then explain the benefits and challenges of 
applying the principle more generally. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. Many thanks to Ken Simons and 
Carissa Hessick for helpful comments. 
** J.D., 2012, Boston University School of Law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Every person with a working understanding of federal sentencing 
law knows this apparently shocking fact: offenders have long been 
sentenced to prison for offenses of which they have never been 
convicted.  Once a federal court has convicted a defendant of one 
offense then that conviction allows the court to sentence for any number 
of other offenses that were never even charged³or that were charged 
but resulted in acquittal. Although this practice has long been common, it 
only began to provoke sustained outrage among legal scholars after the 
advent of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines in the late 1980s.1  Before then, 
it had occurred quietly in trial courts, where no law governed the practice 
and no appellate review disciplined the outcomes.  With the advent of 
the Guidelines, however, it became open and obvious that individuals 
convicted of one offense³say, drug trafficking³faced sentences 
enhanced in sometimes huge proportions by a separate offense³say, a 
murder³that had either gone uncharged or of which they had been 
DFTXLWWHG 6RPHWLPHV VXFK´XQFRQYLFWHGFRQGXFWµFDQEHDQG LVXVHG
for appropriate purposes.  But in some cases, courts simply sentence 
offenders for crimes of which they have never been convicted. 
 The issue we raise here is complicated.  Unlike many scholars, we 
believe that the use of unconvicted conduct at sentencing is often 
legitimate, as the Supreme Court has held.2  At the same time, we share 
much of the outrage of scholars who object to this practice.  It is 
tempting to agree, for example, ZLWK (OL]DEHWK /HDU·V 
FRQGHPQDWLRQ RI WKH XVH RI ´DFTXLWWHG FRQGXFWµZKHQ/HDU RIIHUV WKH
example of United States v. Rivera-Lopez.3  In that case, the defendant was 
convicted of a pair of drug charges but acquitted on a third count, 
possession of three kilograms of cocaine.4  The sentencing judge 
nevertheless found that the defendant had possessed the three kilograms 
DQG WKDW WKH SRVVHVVLRQZDV ´UHOHYDQW FRQGXFWµ WR XVH WKH*XLGHOLQHV
term, for this sentencing.5 $V/HDUUHSRUWV´WKHDGGLWLRQRIWKH relevant 
conduct resulted in the identical punishment range[] which the 
defendant[] would have encountered had [she] been convicted on all 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Susan N. Herman, The Tail that Wagged the Dog: Bifurcated Fact-Finding Under the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Limits of Due Process, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 289 (1992);; 
Elizabeth T. Lear, Is Conviction Irrelevant?, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1179 (1993);; Kevin R. Reitz, 
Sentencing Facts, Travesties of Real-Offense Sentencing, 45 STAN. L. REV. 523, 573 (1993). 
2 See infra Part III.B. 
3 United States v. Rivera-Lopez, 928 F.2d 372 (11th Cir. 1991). 
4 Id. at 372. 
5 See id. at 373. 
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FRXQWVµ6  6LQFHWKHGHIHQGDQW·VDFTXLWWDORQDPDMRUFKDUJHKDGOLWHUDOO\
no effect on the ultimate sentence, it is hard to deny that the judge 
punished her for that very charge.  
 To take an even starker example, consider the sentencing of 
Nelson Frias.  Frias was convicted on two weapons charges³for which 
the Guidelines indicated a sentence of no more than eighteen months³
and was simultaneously acquitted on a drug charge.7 At sentencing, the 
WULDO MXGJHGLVUHJDUGHG WKH MXU\·V DFTXLWWDO IRXQG WKDW)ULDV DFWXDOO\KDG
committed the drug offense, and calculated a Guidelines sentence in the 
neighborhood of twenty years based on his drug quantity.8  In order to 
fully sentence for the drug quantity³notwithstanding the acquittal³the 
trial judge took the unusual step of ordering the ten-year statutory 
maximums for the weapons convictions served consecutively, rather than 
concurrently.9  )ULDV·VHQWHQFH MXPSHGIURPWZHOYHWRHLJKWHHQPRQWKV
which would have applied without the drug facts, to twenty years.10  
Even after the Second Circuit ordered the trial judge to consider a 
downward departure from the Guidelines sentence, Frias was still 
sentenced to twelve years.11  
Even in the age of the Guidelines, then, punishment for 
unconvicted offenses continues unabated.12  It is done now with more 
transparency, and subject to the regularities of law, 13 but there is still little 
official attention to the risk that some defendants face punishment for 
unconvicted offenses. 
 So we agree with Lear and others that there is a serious problem 
here, but we do not accept their analysis of the problem or their 
                                                 
6 Lear, supra note 1, at 1197. 
7 United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 374-75 (2d Cir. 1992). 
8 Id. at 376, 385-86. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 376, 389. 
11 United States v. Frias, 39 F.3d 391, 392 (2d Cir. 1994). 
12 See, e.g.8QLWHG6WDWHVY6PLWK)$SS·[ 37-38 (11th Cir. 2010) (increasing 
sentence for illegal gun possession based on conduct underlying acquittal for carrying a 
firearm in furtherance of an assault on law enforcement officials);; United States v. 
Ashqar, 582 F.3d 819, 823-25 (7th Cir. 2009) (applying terrorism enhancement based on 
acquitted conduct to increase sentence for obstruction of justice and criminal 
FRQWHPSW 8QLWHG 6WDWHV Y 6DPSVRQ  ) $SS·[  -70 (4th Cir. 2007) 
(increasing sentence for perjury and conspiracy to commit perjury based on pending 
unrelated murder charges). 
13 The Guidelines were originally binding on the federal courts.  After United States v. 
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), they are now formally advisory, but, in fact, they still 
exercise substantial control over federal sentencing, see Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 
338, 351 (2007), and, for our purposes, remain nearly as important as when they were 
formally binding.  See infra Part III. 
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prescriptions for reform.  Scholars like Lear have objected to such 
sentences primarily on grounds that we find inadequate.  In particular, 
Lear and others have insisted that conduct underlying an acquitted 
charge should be entirely off-limits at sentencing (or very nearly so).14  
But that position reflects a misunderstanding of the larger problem.  The 
issue, after all, is not so much the use of acquitted conduct but more 
broadly the use of unconvicted conduct.  That is, we should be less focused 
on judicial disregard of acquittals and more broadly concerned with the 
imposition of punishment for any conduct that has not been proven at 
WULDO RU E\ SOHD  :KHWKHU WKDW FRQGXFW ZDV ´DFTXLWWHGµ RU QHYHU
charged at all, we should be very worried when it suddenly surfaces at 
sentencing, GUDPDWLFDOO\HQKDQFLQJWKHGHIHQGDQW·VSXQLVKPHQW 
 Moreover, once one sees that the problem is much bigger than 
acquitted conduct, and that the issue of unconvicted conduct arises 
whenever any fact-finding is done at sentencing, it becomes implausible 
to advocate a universal rule against the use of such conduct at 
sentencing.  The Supreme Court has firmly rejected such a rule, and to 
eliminate the use of unconvicted conduct at sentencing would radically 
alter centuries of established practice, pushing sentencing closer to a 
straight-time system³one in which every offender convicted of the same 
offense serves exactly the same time.  
The value of some judicial fact-finding and discretion at 
sentencing is readily illustrated by another look at Frias.  In that case, it 
SUREDEO\ PDGH JRRG VHQVH WR WDNH DFFRXQW RI )ULDV· GUXJ DFWLYLWLHV LQ
sentencing him for his weapons offenses, whether the drug facts came in 
despite an acquittal on those charges (as actually happened) or despite 
WKHSURVHFXWLRQ·VFKRLFHQRWWRcharge them at all at the trial stage (also a 
frequent occurrence).  Once at sentencing, the judge found them true by 
a preponderance of the evidence.  The judge then logically determined 
that a weapons offender is more culpable and more dangerous if he 
possesses the weapons to facilitate drug deals than if he possesses them, 
for example, for self-GHIHQVH  2I FRXUVH )ULDV· MXU\ GHFOLQHG WR ILQG
every element of the drug charge proven beyond a reasonable doubt;; at 
sentencing, however, the judge remained free to find it more likely than 
not that Frias was sufficiently involved with the drugs that they should 
contextualize his weapons conviction.  Thus, a modest enhancement for 
the drugs would have been legitimate and even appropriate.  But the 
                                                 
14 Lear, supra note 1, at 1185;; Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Recognizing 
Constitutional Rights at Sentencing, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 47, 58-60 (2011);; Reitz, supra note 1, 
at 547-52;; David Yellen, 5HIRUPLQJ WKH)HGHUDO 6HQWHQFLQJ*XLGHOLQHV·0LVJXLGHG$SSURDFK WR
Real-Offense Sentencing, 58 STAN. L. REV. 267, 275 (2005). 
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sheer size of )ULDV· HQKDQFHPHQW LQGLFDWHV WKDW KHZDV SXQLVKHGPXFK
less for the weapons than for the drug deal itself, and the same is true of 
many other federal sentencings.  Using unconvicted conduct to 
contextualize the conviction is appropriate, but punishing an offender for 
the unconvicted conduct is not.  
 Thus, the conundrum: How does one determine, as a general 
matter, when an enhancement has crossed the line from appropriately 
accounting for the convicted offense in its full context to inappropriately 
punishing for a separate offense, of which the defendant has never been 
convicted?  After more than twenty years of Guidelines sentencing, the 
federal system still operates without meaningful rules to prevent 
punishment beyond the offense of conviction. 
 This article will not offer a complete resolution of that 
conundrum, but it will offer an approach that can be readily applied in 
certain categories of cases and that might serve as a starting point for 
extending the discipline of law into the harder cases.  We begin with the 
6XSUHPH &RXUW·V RZQ DIILUPDWLRQ WKDW D IHGHUDO VHQWHQFH PXVW LQGHHG
punish only for convicted offenses, a principle affirmed in the very case 
in which the Court approved the use of acquitted conduct at 
sentencing.15  To justify the use of acquitted conduct, the Court pointed 
to the difference in standards of proof³´EH\RQGDUHDVRQDEOHGRXEWµDW
the conviction stage and mere preponderance at the sentencing stage³
and the fact that general verdicts do not represent particularized findings 
of fact by the jury.16  Thus, an acquittal on one charge need not exclude 
the evidence underlying that charge from the sentencing proceeding on a 
related charge.17  
%XW WKH &RXUW·V PRUH LPSRUWDQW SULQFLSOH ZDV WKDW ZKLOH
unconvicted conduct could legitimately be used to contextualize the 
offense of conviction, it could not be used to punish for an unconvicted 
offense as such.18  In this article, we argue that, although it is challenging 
                                                 
15 See United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 154-55 (1997). 
16 Id. at 155-56. 
17 Id. at 155. For example, an acquittal on a charge of possessing cocaine with intent to 
distribute does not necessarily represent a finding that the defendant did not commit 
the offense but only that the jury had some modest doubt on the question of guilt.  Or, 
even if the jury can be said to have affirmatively found the defendant innocent on at 
least one element of the offense³say, the intent to distribute³that does not mean that 
the jury found the defendant innocent of all elements of the offense, such as the simple 
possession of the drugs.  In any case, the crucial point is that a general verdict leaves us 
WRVSHFXODWHZKDWWKHMXU\·VSUHFLVHILQGLQJVZHUHDQGZKHWKHUSDUWLFXODUILQGLngs of fact 
DWVHQWHQFLQJUHDOO\DUHLQFRQIOLFWZLWKWKHMXU\·VJHQHUDOYHUGLFW 
18 See id. at 154-55. 
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to figure out how to implement this principle in a case like Frias (how 
many years exactly are too many for the additional drugs proven to the 
judge at sentencing?), there are cases where its application is 
straightforward.  
 Our prime example of such a case involves a conviction for 
second-degree murder.  Under federal law, first-degree murder must take 
the form of either premeditated murder or felony murder.19  The absence 
of premeditation or an underlying felony means that the offender has, at 
worst, committed second-degree murder.20  But what if the sentencing 
judge finds premeditation where the jury did not?  Can the judge enhance 
a second-GHJUHHPXUGHUHU·V VHQWHQFH RQ WKH EDVLV RI D SRVW-conviction 
finding that the murder was, in fact, premeditated?  We argue that a 
judge who does so has clearly crossed the line to punishing for an 
unconvicted first-degree murder³no matter the size of the 
enhancement.  The combination of premeditation and unlawful killing is 
by statutory definition first-degree murder, not second-degree murder.  
This judge thus punishes the offender for a different offense from the 
offense of conviction.  And that, we argue, is inconsistent with the 
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, inconsistent with basic principles of the 
Guidelines, and inconsistent with the Constitution as the Supreme Court 
has read it.  
 We begin, in Part II, by describing a couple of second-degree 
murder cases that came out differently in the Fourth and Tenth Circuits.  
Next, in Part III, we look at the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, the 
*XLGHOLQHV· WUHDWPHQW RI ´UHOHYDQW FRQGXFWµ DW VHQWHQFLQJ DQG WKe 
constitutional limits on post-conviction fact-finding indicated by the case 
law of the Supreme Court.  From these sources, we argue in Part IV that 
                                                 
19 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a) (2006). 
Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice 
aforethought.  Every murder perpetrated by poison, lying in wait, or 
any other kind of willful, deliberate, malicious, and premeditated 
killing;; or committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, 
any arson, escape, murder, kidnapping, treason, espionage, sabotage, 
aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse, child abuse, burglary, or 
robbery;; or perpetrated as part of a pattern or practice of assault or 
torture against a child or children;; or perpetrated from a 
premeditated design unlawfully and maliciously to effect the death of 
any human being other than him who is killed, is murder in the first 
degree. 
Any other murder is murder in the second degree. 
Id. 
20 Id.  In contrast to first-degree murder, second-degree murder is simply defined as 
´>D@Q\RWKHUPXUGHUµId.  
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a second-degree murder conviction cannot authorize a sentence based on 
a post-conviction finding of premeditation.  We argue further, in Part V, 
that recognition of the underlying principle³that the sentence must be 
carefully tailored to punish only for the offense of conviction and not for 
anything else³has the potential to impart some sorely needed rationality 
to federal sentencing.  
 
  
I. THE  DILEMMA  
 
 Consider two murder prosecutions: United States v. Kelly,21 a 1993 
case from the Tenth Circuit, and United States v. Barber,22 a 1997 case from 
the Fourth Circuit.  In the first, Jimmy Gene Kelly admitted to killing his 
victim, and the jury only considered whether the murder was 
premeditated.23  Strong evidence pointed towards premeditation: a 
history of bad relations with the victim, allegations that the victim spread 
UXPRUVDERXW.HOO\·VIDPLO\DQG.HOO\·VVWDWHPHQWWRDIULHQGHLJKWGD\V
before the murder that he intended to kill the victim.24  On the day of the 
crime, Kelly invited the victim fishing but did not bring a fishing rod.25  
Notwithstanding all of this evidence, the jury found that Kelly had not 
premeditated the murder and accordingly convicted him of second-
degree murder.26 
 The second-degree conviction pointed to a Guidelines base 
offense level of thirty-three,27 which ZKHQ FRPELQHG ZLWK .HOO\·V
                                                 
21 United States v. Kelly, 1 F.3d 1137 (10th Cir. 1993). 
22 United States v. Barber, 119 F.3d 276 (4th Cir. 1997). 
23 Kelly, 1 F.3d at 1138. 
24 Id. at 1138-39. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 1138.  As discussed earlier, premeditation marks the distinction between federal 
first-degree and second-degree murder.  See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text. 
27 The United States Sentencing Guidelines require a sentencing judge to go through a 
number of technical steps to produce a final sentence.  First, the judge must determine 
a base offense level for the particular offense, as specified in the Guidelines manual.  
Then the judge must add or subtract points to reflect the particular facts of the crime 
and the offender, ending up with a final offense level. At the same time, the judge must 
determine a criminal history score, again adding up points as dictated by the Guidelines 
WRH[SUHVV WKHRIIHQGHU·VKLVWRU\RISULRUFRQYLFWLRQVDQGRWKHUFULPLQDODFWLYLW\ 7KH
judge then refers to the Guidelines sentencing table, finding the offense level on one 
axis and the criminal history score on the other axis, locating the box in the table where 
those two scores meet, and finding there the narrow sentencing range within which the 
judge must presumptively choose a sentence.  Even then, however, the judge is free to 
sentence outside that range if she or he can explain adequately what makes this case 
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criminal history score, required a prison sentence of 151-188 months.  
After having heard the evidence at trial, however, the judge declared that 
´WKH UHFRUG ZDV SUHWW\ FOHDU WR PH DV WKH MXGJH OLVWHQLQJ WR LW WKDW
premeditatioQZDV SUHVHQWµ28  He increased the offense level to forty-
one and sentenced Kelly to 360 months, almost twice as long as the 
maximum sentence within the presumptive Guidelines range for second-
degree murder.29 
 In Barber, the Fourth Circuit confronted a similar situation.30  
Defendants Anthony Barber and David Hodge pled guilty to second-
degree murder for shooting the leader of a drug distribution scheme in 
which Barber had become entangled and robbing the victim of the fifty 
dollars he carried.31  In a statement made to the Government as a 
condition of his plea bargain, Barber admitted that the murder was 
premeditated.32  Both defendants received a base offense level of thirty³
the Guidelines level for second-degree murder minus a reduction for 
acceptance of responsibility for their crimes³which led to a sentencing 
range of 97-121 months.33  However, the sentencing judge in this case 
also found premeditation, departed upwards to an offense level of thirty-
seven, and sentenced each defendant to 210 months³as in Kelly, almost 
GRXEOHWKH*XLGHOLQHV·PD[LPXPSUHVXPHGVHQWHQFH34 
 In each case, the sentencing judge had to decide whether to 
LQFUHDVHWKHGHIHQGDQW·VVHQWHQFHSXUVXDQWWRDILQGLQJRISUHPHGLWDWLRQ
Could this finding appropriately contextualize the second-degree 
murders, thus punishing the offenders for a second-degree murder made 
DOOWKHZRUVHEHFDXVHLWZDVSUHPHGLWDWHG"2UZRXOGWKHMXGJH·VUHOLDQFH
on a finding of premeditation amount to punishment for a distinct 
crime³premeditated second-degree murder³which does not exist in 
the statute books and of which neither had been convicted?  The Fourth 
and Tenth Circuits reached contradictory conclusions: the Fourth Circuit 
found it obvious that premeditation makes a second-degree murder an 
                                                                                                                   
unlike the run of the mill case.  See the Guidelines Manual for details.  U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. 4(h) (1987). 
28 Kelly, 1 F.3d at 1139.  The judge also considered use of dangerous instrumentality, 
restraint of the victim, and extreme conduct as potential aggravating factors warranting 
sentencing departure from the Guidelines.  Id. at 1138. 
29 Id.  
30 United States v. Barber, 119 F.3d 276 (4th Cir. 1997). 
31 Id. at 279. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id.  7KH FRQGLWLRQV RI %DUEHU·V SOHD DJUHHPHQW SUHYHQWHG WKH MXGJH IURP XVLQJ
%DUEHU·V VWDWHPHQW UHJDUGLQJ SUHPHGLWDWLRQ DJDLQVW KLP KRZHYHU WKH MXGJH GLG XVH
SUHPHGLWDWLRQDVRQHIDFWRUMXVWLI\LQJWKHVHQWHQFLQJGHSDUWXUHLQ+RGJH·VFDVHId. 
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especially heinous instance of that offense and considered it 
accordingly;;35 the Tenth Circuit decided that premeditation was simply 
not an available finding in a sentencing for second-degree murder.36  
These decisions highlight a diversity of sentencing practice and theory 
that, in effect, allows federal judges in most of the country³but not in 
the Tenth Circuit³to consider premeditation in sentencing for second-
degree murder.37 
 Although both courts relied heavily on the structure and purpose 
of the Guidelines, their decisions raise questions more fundamental than 
just the proper interpretation of the particular guideline for second-
GHJUHH PXUGHU  %RWK GHFLVLRQV DFNQRZOHGJH MXGJHV· ZLGH-ranging 
authority to consider all relevant information at sentencing, including 
information underlying acquitted offenses and uncharged conduct.38  But 
they force us to ask whether we can nonetheless draw a line between, on 
WKHRQHKDQGWKRVHIDFWVWKDWPD\SURSHUO\DOWHUDGHIHQGDQW·VVHQWHQFH
by providing appropriate context and, on the other, those facts that must 
be excluded because they would lead improperly to punishment for some 
offense other than the offense of conviction.  This problem appears not 
just in murder cases but is embedded deeply and widely in any system 
that rests on post-conviction fact-finding. 
 
 
 
                                                 
35 The Fourth &LUFXLWDIILUPHGWKHWULDOFRXUW·VGHFLVLRQWRVHQWHQFH%DUEHUDQG+RGJH
for premeditated second-degree murder, but only by virtue of an even split in an en 
banc court.  Barber, 119 F.3d at 284-85.  Notwithstanding this even split, which 
rendered any opinion dictum, Judge Wilkins, who had only recently completed his term 
as Chair of the Sentencing Commission, wrote an opinion seeking to legitimate such 
uses of sentencing facts, even when they were apparently inconsistent with the offense 
of conviction.  Id. at 287-90.  That opinion remains the best statement of the law for the 
Fourth Circuit even though it technically has no authority.  
36 United States v. Kelly, 1 F.3d 1137, 1140-41 (10th Cir. 1993). 
37 The Tenth Circuit has remained steadfast in its position.  See United States v. Hanson, 
 )G  WK &LU  DIILUPLQJ WULDO MXGJH·V UHIXVDO WR EDVH GHSDUWXUH LQ
second-degree murder case on premeditation and robbery);; Kelly, 1 F.3d at 1140-41 
UHYHUVLQJ ORZHU FRXUW·V GHSDUWXUH GHFLVLRQ EDVHG RQ SUHPHditation in second-degree 
murder);; cf. 8QLWHG6WDWHVY:ROIH)GWK&LU´7KHGLVWULFW
court in this case, in departing upward from the involuntary-manslaughter range 
halfway to the range provided for second-degree murder, never H[SODLQHGZK\:ROIH·V
conduct, which resulted in two involuntary-manslaughter convictions, should instead be 
treated as more like second-GHJUHHPXUGHULQYROYLQJPDOLFHDIRUHWKRXJKWµ 
38 See infra 3DUW,,,$IRUDGLVFXVVLRQRIWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW·VGHFLVLRns addressing the 
use of uncharged and acquitted conduct in sentencing.  
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II. THE   MODERN   LAW   OF   FEDERAL   SENTENCING:   STATUTE,  
GUIDELINES,  CONSTITUTION    
  
A. Federal   Sentencing   Guidelines:   Grappling   with   Judicial  
Discretion  
 
In 1984, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act, which 
created the United States Sentencing Commission.39  The Act charged 
the Commission with developing a system of mandatory sentencing 
JXLGHOLQHV WKDW ZRXOG LPSRVH ODZ RQ MXGJHV· VHQWHQFLQJ GHFLVLRQV40  
Earlier in the twentieth century, and stretching back into the nineteenth 
century, sentencing practice had often followed a rehabilitative model, 
IRFXVLQJ RQ WKH GHIHQGDQW·V LQGLYLGXDO FULPH DQG FKDUDFWHULVWLFV DQG
seeking to impose a sentence specifically addressing these particularities.41  
Ideally, the individually tailored sentence would maximize the chances 
IRU VXFFHVVIXO´WUHDWPHQWµRI WKHSDUWLFXODURIIHQGHUDQG IRUKHURUKLV
ultimate return to society as a productive citizen.  This model suggested 
to the federal courts that no concrete rules should constrain the trial 
FRXUW·V QHFHVVDULOy flexible discretion in tailoring a sentence for any 
particular offender.42  
In fact, in 1949³at the height of the vogue for rehabilitation (or 
´UHIRUPDWLRQµ DV LW ZDV WKHQ FRPPRQO\ FDOOHG³the Supreme Court 
famously held in Williams v. New York that core trial rights, such as the 
right to cross-examine adverse witnesses and even to have full access to 
the evidence used against oneself, simply did not apply at sentencing.43  
That holding depended on the belief that the sentencing judge must 
determine the prRSHU´WUHDWPHQWµIRUWKHRIIHQGHUDWDVNWKDWGHPDQGHG
WKH MXGJH·V SRVVHVVLRQ RI WKH IXOOHVW SRVVLEOH LQIRUPDWLRQ DERXW WKH
RIIHQGHU HYHQ LI WKH ODWWHU·V ULJKWV ZHUH FXUWDLOHG WR IDFLOLWDWH WKH
gathering of that information.  The Court celebrated the success of 
                                                 
39 Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 217, 98 Stat. 1987, 2017. 
40 Rachel E. Barkow, 5HFKDUJLQJWKH-XU\7KH&ULPLQDO-XU\·V&RQVWLWXWLRQDO5ROHLQDQ(UDRI
Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 88-89 (2003) (describing the development of 
the Sentencing Guidelines). 
41 DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE 31-32, 60 (1980);; Frank O. 
Bowman, III, Debacle: How the Supreme Court Has Mangled American Sentencing Law and How 
It Might Yet Be Mended, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 367 (2010).  
42 For a history of this theoretical approach to criminal law in the twentieth century, see 
Gerald Leonard, Towards a Legal History of American Criminal Theory: Culture and Doctrine 
from Blackstone to the Model Penal Code, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 691, 803-826 (2003). 
43 Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 245-50 (1949). 
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modern rehabilitationism and, with utterly benevolent intentions, used 
that theory to render sentencing a sphere of nearly complete lawlessness: 
 
 Modern changes in the treatment of offenders 
make it more necessary now than a century ago for 
observance of the distinctions in the evidential procedure 
in the trial and sentencing processes. . . . 
 Under the practice of individualizing 
punishments, investigation techniques have been given an 
important role.  Probation workers making reports of 
their investigations have not been trained to prosecute 
but to aid offenders.  Their reports have been given a 
high value by conscientious judges who want to sentence 
persons on the best available information rather than on 
guesswork and inadequate information. . . . We must 
recognize that most of the information now relied upon 
by judges to guide them in the intelligent imposition of 
sentences would be unavailable if information were 
restricted to that given in open court by witnesses subject 
to cross-examination.44 
 
Consistent with this ruling, criminal sentences were rarely even subject to 
appellate review, since appellate courts were poorly equipped to second-
guess judgments made in the trial courts about proper, individualized 
´WUHDWPHQWµ45  Professor Kate Stith and Judge José Cabranes later 
described the extraordinary scope of sentencing discretion with some 
horror:  
 
What made sentencing authority truly extraordinary was 
not the broad discretion the judge exercised, but, rather, 
the fact that the decision was virtually unreviewable on 
appeal.  The lack of appellate review meant that the 
unreasonable or inexplicable³or even the bizarre³
decision at this stage was beyond correction.  In addition, 
no common standards or principles were articulated to 
guide the exercise of judgment in sentencing.46  
 
                                                 
44 Id. at 247-50 (citations omitted). 
45 See Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 431, 443-44 (1974). 
46 Kate Stith & José A. Cabranes, Judging Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 91 Nw. U. 
L. Rev. 1247, 1251-52 (1997) (citation omitted). 
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By the 1970s, academics and legislators increasingly voiced 
concern that this individually tailored model of sentencing allowed for 
too much judicial discretion.47 Similarly situated defendants committing 
similar crimes often received wildly disparate sentences across, and even 
within, jurisdictions.  Some critics worried that the disparities might, in 
part, be racially motivated.48  Others felt that pervasive judicial discretion 
meant that too many offenders got off with lighter sentences than they 
deserved.49  At the same time, the great confidence in rehabilitation that 
had informed the Williams opinion and dominated penology in the mid-
twentieth century began to fade rapidly.50 
 7KH 6HQWHQFLQJ 5HIRUP $FW RI  ´65$µ reflected these 
shifts in attitude. The SRA turned federal sentencing on its head in 
important respects, replacing boundless discretion with precisely 
articulated mandatory guidelines for federal sentencing, seeking to ensure 
that similar offenders would receive similar sentences, and rejecting 
rehabilitation altogether as a basis for any sentence of incarceration.  
7KXV WKH 65$ SURYLGHG WKDW ´The Commission shall insure that the 
guidelines reflect the inappropriateness of imposing a sentence to a term 
of imprisonment for the purpose of rehabilitating the defendant or 
providing the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, 
                                                 
47 AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 143-44 (1971);; ROBERT O. 
DAWSON, SENTENCING: THE DECISION AS TO TYPE, LENGTH, AND CONDITIONS OF 
SENTENCE 3-4 (1969);; ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK 
FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT 4 (1976);; 
MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES 103-04 (1973);; LESLIE T. WILKINS ET 
AL., SENTENCING GUIDELINES: STRUCTURING JUDICIAL DISCRETION, at xiii-xviii 
(1978);; Francis Allen, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative Ideal, 50 J. CRIM. L. 
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 226, 227-29 (1959);; Stith & Cabranes, supra note 46, at 
374-75. 
48 Placido G. Gomez, The Dilemma of Difference: Race as a Sentencing Factor, 24 GOLDEN 
GATE U. L. REV. 357, 358-60 (1994) ´,Q  EODFNV DFFRXQWHG IRU  RI WKLV
FRXQWU\·VDGXOWPDOHSRSXODWLRQ\HWRFFXSLHGRIWKHEHGVLQRXUVWDWHSULVRQVµ 
49 Bowman, supra note 41, at 374. 
50 See, e.g., FRANKEL, supra note 47 DW  ´,W LV QRW GLVDJUHHDEOH IRU SHRSOH ¶LQ WKH
FRPPXQLW\DQG LQ WKHILHOGRIFULPLQDO MXVWLFH·DVVXPLQJWKH\KDYHQRPRUHSUHVVLQJ
things to do, to devote their energies to the attempted proof or accomplishment of 
universal redeemability. What is disagreeable³and vicious³is to cage prisoners for 
indeterminate stretches while we set about their assured rehabilitation, not knowing 
what to do for them, oU UHDOO\ ZKHWKHU ZH FDQ GR DQ\ XVHIXO WKLQJ IRU WKHPµ
NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 17 (1974);; DERSHOWITZ, supra note 
47DW ´%\IDLOLQJ WRDGPLQLVWHUHLWKHUHTXLWDEOHRUVXUHSXQLVKPHQW WKH VHQWHQFLQJ
system³if anything permitting such wide latitude for the individual discretion of 
various authorities can be so signified³undermines the entire criminal justice 
structureµSee generally, ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE chs. 2-4 (1976). 
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PHGLFDO FDUH RU RWKHU FRUUHFWLRQDO WUHDWPHQWµ51  Instead, it aimed to 
´SURYLGH FHUWDLQW\ DQG IDLUQHVV LQPHHWLQJ WKH purposes of sentencing, 
avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with 
similar records who have been found guilty of similar criminal 
FRQGXFWµ52  The SRA abandoned rehabilitation and, in § 3553(a)(2), 
defined the purposes of sentencing as follows:  
 
´(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote 
respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for 
the offense;;  
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;;  
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the 
GHIHQGDQWµ53  
 
Rehabilitation of a sort³WKDW LVSURYLGLQJ´WKHGHIHQGDQWZLWKQHHGHG
educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional 
WUHDWPHQW LQ WKH PRVW HIIHFWLYH PDQQHUµ³remained one purpose of 
sentencing, as reflected in subsection (D) of this provision;;54 but, as 
indicated above, it could no longer justify incarceration, only certain 
forms of probation and treatment outside of prison.55  
 In short, the SRA rejected a fundamental premise of Williams³
that incarceration was meant to rehabilitate and that judges must 
therefore have access to unlimited information about the offender to 
effect that rehabilitation³DQG IRFXVHG LQVWHDG RQ SURYLGLQJ ´MXVW
SXQLVKPHQWµ ´DGHTXDWHGHWHUUHQFHµ DQG DPHDVXUHRI LQFDSDFLWDWLRQ56  
In doing so, the Guidelines sentencing sought to equalize sentences 
DPRQJ´GHIHQGDQWVZLWKVLPLODUUHFRUGVZKRKDYHEHHQIRXQGJXLOW\RI
VLPLODU FULPLQDO FRQGXFWµ57  Rehabilitation and discretion were out, 
replaced E\ D VLPSOH WKHRU\ WKDW EHLQJ ´IRXQG JXLOW\µ RI SDUWLFXODU
conduct should bring predictable sentencing consequences and that prior 
criminal records should aggravate those consequences in predictable 
ways.  The resulting sentences would be presumptively adequate to 
punish justly, deter, and incapacitate.  Moreover, by introducing 
                                                 
51 28 U.S.C. § 994(k) (2006);; see Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2393 (2011) 
´>$@ FRXUWPD\ QRW LPSRVH RU OHQJWKHQ D SULVRQ VHQWHQFH WR HQDEOH DQ RIIHQGHU WR
complete a treatmeQWSURJUDPRURWKHUZLVHWRSURPRWHUHKDELOLWDWLRQµ 
52 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (Supp. II 2008). 
53 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (Supp. IV 2010). 
54 Id. 
55 See Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2390. 
56 § 3553(a)(2). 
57 Id. 
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substantive appellate review of sentences, the SRA ensured the 
VHQWHQFLQJ FRXUWV· IDLWKIXO LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ RI WKH DERYH WKHRU\ DQG
purposes of punishment.58 
 In theory, the United States Sentencing Commission, which was 
created by the SRA and charged with writing the mandatory Guidelines, 
FRXOGKDYH LPSOHPHQWHG WKH DERYHSXUSRVHVE\ZD\RI DSXUH ´FKDUJH
RIIHQVHµV\VWHPLQZKLFKWKHRIIHQGHULVSXQLVKHGVWULFWO\RQWKHEDVLVRI
the offense of conviction, without any attention to the particulars of the 
offense conduct or its context, although with some attention to the 
RIIHQGHU·VFULPLQDOUHFRUG6XFKDV\VWHPODUJHO\LJQRUHVWKHFRQWH[WVRI
particular offenses³the facts that might make one weapons offense, for 
example, much more severe than another.  The Commission rejected 
VXFK DPHFKDQLFDO DSSURDFK EXW LW DOVR UHMHFWHG D SXUH ´UHDO RIIHQVHµ
system.  Under a pure real offense system, a defendant receives 
punishment based on whatever conduct the sentencing court believed 
actually occurred, regardless of the precise offense of conviction.59  
Instead, the Sentencing Commission created a modified real offense 
system of sentencing, adopting a middle ground that reflected the 
language of the SRA.60  This system instructs the judge to use a 
GHIHQGDQW·VFRQYLFWLRQSOXVDQ\QXPEHURIFRQWH[WXDO IDFWRUV VSHFLILHG
by the Guidelines as relevant to the offense of conviction, to establish an 
offense level from one to forty-three.61  The judge then cross-references 
WKH RIIHQVH OHYHO ZLWK WKH GHIHQGDQW·V FULPLQDO KLVWRU\ FDWHJRU\ RQ D
scale from one to six), which provides a presumptive sentencing range in 
months.62 
 In the modified real offense system designed by the SRA, it was 
clear that judges could no longer rely on the extraordinarily wide range of 
information and discretion that had informed sentencings under the 
rehabilitative model.  But there remained the question of the exact scope 
of information that would be available to the judge and its precise 
purposes.  Before the enactment of the SRA, federal law provided that, 
´No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the 
                                                 
58 See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996). 
59 Barkow, supra note 40. 
60 See Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon Which 
They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 8-12 (1988). 
61 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. 4(h) (1987). 
62 See id. ch. 5, pt. A (sentencing table).  The table lists offense levels on the y-axis and 
criminal histories on the x-axis.  The point of intersection yields the presumptive 
sentencing range.  The Commission structured the table to include overlap in the ranges 
as the offense level moves consecutively higher or lower.  Id. ch. 1, pt. A, introductory 
cmt. 4(h). 
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background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense 
which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the 
SXUSRVHRILPSRVLQJDQDSSURSULDWHVHQWHQFHµ63  And this statutory relic 
of the rehabilitation era remains on the books today.  At the same time, 
the SRA made clear that Williams no longer applied.  Even if judges 
might still have full Williams-like access to information about the 
offender, they could no longer use all of that information just as they 
pleased.  Rather, the SRA required the Commission to implement 
guidelines that would compel judges to impose sentences only for certain 
HQXPHUDWHGSXUSRVHVQDPHO\´MXVWSXQLVKPHQWµ´DGHTXDWHGHWHUUHQFHµ
and incapacitation.64  To this end, the Commission was empowered³or 
in some cases, required³to exclude whole categories of information 
from consideration at sentencing, categories that had seemed relevant for 
rehabilitation purposes.65  After the SRA and continuing to the present 
day, judges no longer have the freedom to rely on any and all 
information about the offenders they sentence but instead must sentence 
only on the basis of information rationally related to the statutory 
purposes enumerated in § 3553(a)(2).  
 In addition to these statutory constraints, the Guidelines 
themselves, which are administrative rules promulgated by the 
Commission, further constrain judges.  The fundamental provisions of 
WKH*XLGHOLQHVLQFOXGH%WKH´UHOHYDQWFRQGXFWµJXLGHOLQH66  In its 
most pertinent part, this guideline orders that offense levels should be 
GHWHUPLQHG E\ H[DPLQLQJ ´DOO DFWV DQG RPLVVLRQV FRPPLWWHG DLGHG
abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused 
by the defendant . . . that occurred during the commission of the offense 
of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course of 
DWWHPSWLQJWRDYRLGGHWHFWLRQRUUHVSRQVLELOLW\IRUWKDWRIIHQVHµDVZHOO
as all harm caused or intended by the offender.67  This provision 
mandates consideration of all conduct underlying the offense of 
conviction.  It does not call for consideration of conduct apart from the 
offense of conviction, but it does require attention to every detail of the 
RIIHQGHU·VFRQGXFWWKDWUHODWHVWRWKHRIIHQVHRIFRQYLFWLRQ 
                                                 
63 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2006). 
64 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (Supp. IV 2010). 
65 See 28 U.S.C. § 994(c)-(e) (2006) (authorizing or requiring the Commission to exclude 
or limit the use of numerous categories of evidence including the general exclusion of 
´WKH HGXFDWLRQ YRFDWLRQDO VNLOOV HPSOR\PHQW UHFRUG family ties and responsibilities, 
DQGFRPPXQLW\WLHVRIWKHGHIHQGDQWµ 
66 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3(a) (1987). 
67 Id. 
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 After determining an offense level (and a criminal history 
FDWHJRU\ D MXGJH FKRRVHV D VHQWHQFHZLWKLQ WKH*XLGHOLQHV· QDUURZHG
but still substantial, range.68  Here, within those narrower bounds, the 
&RPPLVVLRQ DOORZV MXGJHV WKHLU ROG GLVFUHWLRQ ´In determining the 
sentence to impose within the guideline range, or whether a departure 
from the guidelines is warranted, the court may consider, without 
limitation, any information concerning the background, character and 
conduct of the defendant, unless otherwiVHSURKLELWHGE\ ODZµ69  Even 
when the Guidelines were mandatory, the court could depart upward or 
downward from the range³as indicated in the provision just quoted³
EXW´RQO\ZKHQLWIRXQG ¶DQDJJUDYDWLQJRUPLWLJDWLQJFLUFXPVWDQFH   
that was not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing 
&RPPLVVLRQ·µ70  This safety valve was intended to operate only in rare 
cases.  In developing the Guidelines, the Sentencing Commission 
analyzed comprehensive criminal sentencing data and attempted to 
account for most relevant distinctions in conduct and criminal history in 
devising offense categories.71  Still, the Commission necessarily 
recognized that some factors could never be fully accounted for in 
advance, and it sought to keep enough judicial discretion within the 
V\VWHPWRDSSURSULDWHO\DGGUHVV´DQXQXVXDOFDVHµ72  
Thus, through the Commission, the SRA propelled sentencing 
practice away from a model of unbounded judicial discretion, premised 
on rehabilitation, toward a more structured system that imposes 
discipline on judges and a measure of predictability on sentencing.  It 
requires that sentences of incarceration rest not on a rationale of 
rehabilitation but on a theory that similar offenses committed in a similar 
fashion by offenders with similar criminal records should be punished 
with similar terms of imprisonment.  Both the language of the SRA³
IRFXVLQJRQ´defendants with similar records who have been found guilty 
RIVLPLODUFRQGXFWµ73³and the language of the Commission in § 1B1.3³
specifying conduct UHOHYDQW WR´WKHRIIHQVHRIFRQYLFWLRQµ³make clear 
                                                 
68 Guidelines sentencing ranges have a minimum and a maximum, which is about 25% 
higher than the minimum.  See id. ch. 5, pt. A (sentencing table). 
69 Id. § 1B1.4.  
70 Id. ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. 4(b) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)). 
71 Id. LQWURGXFWRU\ FPW  ´>7KH&RPPLVVLRQ KDV@ DQDO\]HG GDWD GUDZQ IURP 
presentence investigations, the differing elements of various crimes as distinguished in 
VXEVWDQWLYH FULPLQDO VWDWXWHV WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV 3DUROH &RPPLVVLRQ·V JXLGHOLQHV DQG
statistics, and data from other relevant sources in order to determine which distinctions 
were important in pre-JXLGHOLQHVSUDFWLFHµ 
72 Id. introductory cmt. 3-4(b).  
73 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (Supp. II 2008) (emphasis added). 
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that federal sentencing is no longer about the rehabilitative penology of 
the Williams era, which left all law and trial protections behind as it 
EURXJKWWKHRIIHQGHU·VHQWLUHOLIHEHIRUHWKHEDU5DWKHU the statute and 
the Guidelines tie sentencing to the offense of conviction (in all its 
particularity) and the need to pursue just punishment for that offense, as 
well as adequate deterrence and incapacitation. 
 
B. Constitutional  Case  Law  
 
 Although recent case law has rendered the formerly mandatory 
Guidelines merely advisory,74 the basic principles of the SRA and the 
&RPPLVVLRQ·VHIIRUWWRLPSOHPHQWWKHPUHPDLQLQHIIHFW0RUHRYHUDV
this section will show, the Supreme Court has embraced the common 
sense principle that sentencing should bear a close relationship to the 
particular conviction that authorizes and legitimates punishment in the 
first place. Though Williams might seem to contradict that principle, the 
case has an uncertain status these days.75  It may well remain good law 
insofar as it holds that a legislature may frame sentencing as a proceeding 
aimed at rehabilitation and that, if a legislature does so, it may authorize a 
judge to consider unlimited information about the offender without basic 
trial protections.  But the scope and vitality of Williams·VDXWKRULW\DUHLQ
doubt not only because rehabilitation is now foreign to federal 
sentencing, at least for sentences of imprisonment, but also because 
more recent double jeopardy cases indicate that the rehabilitative 
premises of Williams may not have the constitutional status they once 
did. While Williams held that judges might constitutionally rely on a very 
broad scope of information obtained by informal means, two modern 
Supreme Court cases suggest that a sentencing judge faces real 
constitutional constraints on the ways in which she or he can use that 
information.  
The first of these cases is United States v. Watts, which squarely 
legitimated the use of acquitted and unconvicted conduct at sentencing.76  
Many commentators condemn Watts for weakening the important role of 
juries and convictions in determining the proper bases of sentencing.77  
But we see no important problems with Watts.  Rather, even as the case 
                                                 
74 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226 (2005). 
75 W. David Ball, Heinous, Atrocious, and Cruel: Apprendi, Indeterminate Sentencing, and the 
Meaning of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 893, 926-29 (2009);; Hessick & Hessick, supra 
note 14, at 85. 
76 United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 156-57 (1997). 
77 See sources cited supra note 14.  
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legitimated broad fact-finding and consideration of acquitted conduct, it 
simultaneously embraced a premise that should be understood to 
discipline fact-finding in fundamental respects.  
Watts was tried for possession of cocaine base with intent to 
distribute and for gun possession in connection with a drug offense.78  
The jury convicted him of drug possession but acquitted him on the gun 
charge.  Nevertheless, the sentencing judge found by a preponderance of 
the evidence that Watts had possessed the gun in connection with the 
drug offense and raised his sentence under the Guidelines accordingly.79  
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the sentence, 
holding that a judge could not find facts, even by a preponderance of the 
HYLGHQFHWKDWZHUH´QHFHVVDULO\UHMHFWHGµE\WKHMXU\in reaching a verdict 
of not guilty.80  The Supreme Court reinstated the sentence, emphasizing 
WKDW´>Q@HLWKHUWKHEURDGODQJXDJHRI>DGPLWWLQJVHQWHQFLQJIDFWV
ZLWK¶QROLPLWDWLRQ·@QRURXUKROGLQJLQWilliams suggests any basis for the 
courts to invent a blanket prohibition against considering certain types of 
HYLGHQFHDWVHQWHQFLQJµ81  
The Watts holding rested on several grounds, among them that 
courts had long taken into account acquitted conduct along with many 
other categories of facts at sentencing;; that § 3661 continued to say that 
´QR OLPLWDWLRQµ VKRXOG EH SODFHG RQ WKH LQIRUPDWLRQ DYDLODEOH WR WKH
judge at sentencing;; and that § 1B1.3 of the Guidelines indicated 
implicitly in its text and explicitly in its authoritative commentary that 
acquiWWHGDQGXQFRQYLFWHGFRQGXFWVKRXOGFRPHLQDV´UHOHYDQWFRQGXFWµ
in appropriate cases.82  
Still, none of these justifications would do the job if, as the Ninth 
Circuit had suggested, sentencing on the basis of acquitted conduct 
violated the Double Jeopardy &ODXVH7KH1LQWK&LUFXLW·VSRVLWLRQPDGH
a good deal of common sense, since Watts had been tried and acquitted 
once on the gun charge and then at sentencing found himself in danger 
of punishment for that offense all over again.  The Supreme Court, 
however, escaped that argument by holding that an offender is not 
´SXQLVKHGµ IRU D SDUWLFXODU VHQWHQFLQJ IDFW WKDW HQKDQFHV WKH VHQWHQFH
Rather, the offender is still punished only for the offense of conviction;; 
the sentencing fact merely contextualizes that RIIHQVH7KXVWKH&RXUW·V
reasoning suggested one fundamental limit on the facts that a sentencing 
                                                 
78 Watts, 519 U.S. at 149-50. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 150. 
81 Id. at 152. 
82 Id. at 151-53. 
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court might consider.  Those facts must serve only to contextualize the 
RIIHQVH RI ZKLFK WKH GHIHQGDQW KDV DFWXDOO\ EHHQ FRQYLFWHG ´As we 
explained in Witte, . . . sentencing enhancements do not punish a 
defendant for crimes of which he was not convicted, but rather increase 
his sentence because of the manner in which he committed the crime of 
FRQYLFWLRQµ83  
In Witte v. United States, the case on which Watts primarily relied, 
Witte was initially convicted of marijuana possession with intent to 
distribute.84  A year prior to the marijuana incident, however, he had also 
attempted to import cocaine.85  The sentencing judge determined that the 
cocaine attempt constituted part of the same criminal conspiracy and 
DFFRUGLQJO\HQKDQFHG:LWWH·VVHQWHQFHRQWKHPDULMXDQDFKDUJH86  When 
the cocaine incident subsequently formed the basis of a separate 
indictment on charges of attempting to import cocaine, Witte argued that 
reusing conduct already considered at an earlier sentencing violated his 
rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause.87  The Supreme Court, 
KRZHYHUGLVDJUHHG$FFRUGLQJWRWKH&RXUW:LWWH·VVHQWHQFHDWWKHILUVW
trial punished him only for his conviction for marijuana possession.  The 
attempt to import cocaine contextualized the marijuana offense and 
enhanced its severity, justifying an increased sentence, but the increase 
did not constitute separate punishment for a separate offense.88 
 
To the extent that the Guidelines aggravate 
punishment for related conduct outside the elements of 
the crime on the theory that such conduct bears on the 
´FKDUDFWHURI WKHRIIHQVHµ WKHRIIHQGHU LV VWLOO SXQLVKHG
only for the fact that the present offense was carried out in 
a manner that warrants increased punishment, not for a 
different offense (which that related conduct may or may 
not constitute).89 
 
This distinction between punishment for a sentencing fact and 
punishment for the offense of conviction as contextualized by a sentencing 
fact was fundamental. 
 
                                                 
83 Id. at 154. 
84 Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 392-93 (1995). 
85 Id. at 391-92. 
86 Id. at 393-95. 
87 Id. at 394-95. 
88 Id. at 402-03. 
89 Id. 
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Because consideration of relevant conduct in determining 
DGHIHQGDQW·V VHQWHQFHZLWKLQ WKH OHJLVODWLYHO\ DXWKRUL]HG
punishment range does not constitute punishment for 
that conduct, the instant prosecution does not violate the 
'RXEOH -HRSDUG\ &ODXVH·V SURKLELWLRQ DJDLQVW WKH
imposition of multiple punishments for the same 
offense.90  
 
7KHFOHDULPSOLFDWLRQRIWKLVKROGLQJLVWKDWLI´UHOHYDQWFRQGXFWµ
was used to punish for the sentencing fact itself and not just to 
contextualize the offense of conviction, then such use would violate the 
Double Jeopardy Clause.91  Thus, the Court held both that the Guidelines 
do indeed use relevant conduct only for contextualization, as the 
language of the SRA and § 1B1.3 both suggest, and that it would be 
unconstitutional for them to do otherwise³that is, to convert modified 
real offense sentencing into pure real offense sentencing, rendering the 
offense of conviction a mere pretext for punishing the offender for any 
and every bad act the judge might identify at sentencing.  
We should note that, since Watts and Witte were, in part, Double 
Jeopardy cases, their constitutional holdings arguably apply only in cases 
                                                 
90 Id. DW  ´>2@XU SUHFHGHQWV    PDNH FOHDU WKDW D GHIHQGDQW LQ WKDW VLWXDWLRQ LV
punished, for double jeopardy purposes, only for the offense of which the defendant is 
FRQYLFWHGµId. at 397.  
91 Core Eighth Amendment cases are to the same effect, notwithstanding a recent 
DUJXPHQW WKDW WKH&RXUW·V OHJLWLPDWLRQ RI WKUHH-strikes laws in Ewing v. California, 538 
U.S. 11 (2003) constituted an admission that courts could punish not only for the 
offense of conviction but also for prior offenses. See Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. 
Andrew Hessick, Double Jeopardy as a Limit on Punishment, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 45, 73-75 
(2011).  In fact, the reasoning of Ewing was exactly that the offense of conviction might 
be appropriately contextualized by³not evaded by³the fact of the RIIHQGHU·V SULRU
record.  Where that prior record is severe, the meaning of the current offense is not just 
that the defendant committed, for example, a larceny, but that that latest larceny, when 
FRQWH[WXDOL]HG E\ WKH RIIHQGHU·V SUHYLRXV FRQYLFWLRQV VWDnds as evidence of the 
GHIHQGDQW·V LQFRUULJLELOLW\ 6XFK LQFRUULJLELOLW\ LV UDWLRQDO MXVWLILFDWLRQ IRU LPSRVLQJDQ
especially harsh sentence for this latest offense. It is true that there is language in Ewing 
that, when taken out of context, sounds like an endorsement of punishment beyond the 
offense of conviction.  See Ewing86DW ´,QZHLJKLQJ WKHJUDYLW\RI(ZLQJ
V
offense, we must place on the scales not only his current felony, but also his long 
KLVWRU\RIIHORQ\UHFLGLYLVPµ%XWWKH&RXUt makes clear that it does not mean by this 
that Ewing may be punished again for his prior offenses as such.  Rather, it cites Witte 
IRU WKH SURSRVLWLRQ WKDW ´,Q UHSHDWHGO\ XSKROGLQJ VXFK UHFLGLYLVP VWDWXWHV ZH KDYH
rejected double jeopardy challenges because the enhanced punishment imposed for the 
later offense    >LV@ ¶D VWLIIHQHGSHQDOW\ for the latest crime, which is considered to be an 
DJJUDYDWHGRIIHQVHEHFDXVHDUHSHWLWLYHRQH·µId. at 25-26 (emphasis added). 
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where the challenged sentencing fact has already been the subject of an 
adjudication, whether an acquittal (Watts) or a conviction (Witte).  But the 
SUHPLVHRIWKH&RXUW·VDIILUPDQFHV LQWKRVHFDVHV LV WKDW WKHVHQWHQFLQJ
regime created by the SRA and the Guidelines provides only for 
punishment of the offense of conviction, not punishment of unconvicted 
offenses.  
The constitutional argument for limiting sentences to offenses of 
conviction also gains strength from consideration of the jury right under 
the Sixth Amendment.  It should seem obvious that, under the 
Constitution, the State cannot punish someone for an unconvicted 
offense just because that person has been convicted of another offense.  
After all, what is the purpose of the Sixth Amendment jury right, if not 
to protect persons from punishment until they have been duly convicted 
of the conduct for which they are being punished?  This obvious 
DUJXPHQWVHHPVWRXVWKHFRUUHFWDUJXPHQW%XWFRQVLGHULQJWKH&RXUW·V
recent abundance of case law on the jury right, it does seem necessary to 
elaborate. 
 In recent years, the Supreme Court has sought to give meaningful 
content to the jury right.  In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Court struck down 
a law that would have bypassed the jury by increasing the statutory 
PD[LPXP VHQWHQFH IRU WKH GHIHQGDQW·V FULPH EDVHG RQ D PHUH judicial 
finding that racial bias motivated the commission of the offense.92  In 
making its decision, the Court emphasized its concern for protecting the 
constitutional power of the jury to find those facts essential to 
punishment.  In the earliest days of the criminal justice system, the jury 
YHUGLFW RIWHQ GHILQLWLYHO\ HVWDEOLVKHG D GHIHQGDQW·V SXQLVKPHQW
eliminating all judicial discretion in the sentencing.93  Similarly, American 
juries have always had the authority to issue unreviewable acquittals, 
´VWDQG>LQJ@EHWZHHQWKHLQGLYLGXDODQGWKHSRZHURIWKHJRYHUQPHQWµ94 
thus excluding judicial discretion from the process.  And while judges 
gradually gained general authority to contextualize the offense by finding 
DGGLWLRQDO IDFWV DW VHQWHQFLQJ WKH MXU\·V YHUGLFW KDV Dlways set the 
ERXQGDULHV IRU WKH H[HUFLVH RI WKDW DXWKRULW\  7KH &RXUW·V KROGLQJ LQ
Apprendi reaffirmed that judges can find facts that contextualize an 
offense and enhance punishment but that the jury must first convict the 
                                                 
92 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 491 (2000). 
93 See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 40, at 78-79;; Chris Kemmitt, Function over Form: Reviving the 
&ULPLQDO -XU\·V +LVWRULFDO 5ROH DV D Sentencing Body, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 93, 98-99 
(2006). 
94 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 237 (2005). 
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defendant.95  That conviction must set a hard statutory maximum to 
control the judge.96 
 Mandatory sentencing guidelines presented a different but related 
FKDOOHQJHWRMXU\SRZHUVLQFHMXGJHVZRXOGURXWLQHO\ILQGIDFWV´UHOHYDQW
FRQGXFWµDWVHQWHQFLQJWKDWUHVXOWHGLQKLJKHU*XLGHOLQHs sentences than 
the jury conviction alone would have authorized.  In the cases after 
Apprendi, the Court ruled that it was unconstitutional for judges to find 
IDFWV WKDW UDLVHG D GHIHQGDQW·V VHQWHQFH DERYH WKH PDQGDWRU\ UDQJH
established by the Guidelines.  In Blakely v. Washington97 and United States 
v. Booker,98 the Court held that a defendant has a Sixth Amendment right 
to have a jury do that sort of fact-ILQGLQJ´$Q\IDFWRWKHUWKDQDSULRU
conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the 
maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury 
verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a 
UHDVRQDEOH GRXEWµ99  This holding preserved the jury right not by 
OLPLWLQJMXGJHV·WUDGLWLRQDOIDFW-finding discretion, but rather by ensuring 
that judges exercise their discretion only within the bounds set by the 
MXU\·VFRQYLFWLRQ 
 Since these bounds might still be quite broad in terms of years of 
imprisonment, one might doubt that the Court has really preserved much 
in the way of jury power.  After all, legislatures remain free to create 
sentencing regimes with broader or narrower sentencing ranges, as they 
prefer.  And, in an odd twist in the famously strange Booker case, the 
Supreme Court itself restored very wide sentencing ranges to the federal 
judiciary simply by reading the mandatory quality of the Guidelines out 
of the statute.100 Although judges must still consult the Guidelines and 
make an initial determination of the appropriate Guidelines sentence, the 
judge has full authority to sentence the defendant anywhere within the 
statutory range, subject to reasonableness review upon appeal.101 The 
Court thus reintroduced a breadth of judicial discretion approaching that 
of the pre-Guidelines era, eroding the value of the vaunted jury right.  
 A substantial commitment to the jury power remains in the 
&RXUW·V FDVH ODZKRZHYHU  ,QBlakely, Justice Scalia acknowledged that 
                                                 
95 Apprendi 86 DW ´2WKHU WKDQ WKH IDFWRI DSULRU FRQYLFWLRQ DQ\ IDFW WKDW
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be 
VXEPLWWHGWRDMXU\DQGSURYHGEH\RQGDUHDVRQDEOHGRXEWµ 
96 Id. 
97 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
98 Booker, 543 U.S. 220. 
99 Id. at 244. 
100 Id. at 259. 
101 Id. at 259-61.  
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WKH &RXUW·V LQMHFWLRQ RI D VWUHQJWKHQHG MXU\ ULJKW LQWR GHWHUPLQDWH
sentencing schemes might lead legislatures to revert to indeterminate 
sentencing schemes that would increase judicial discretion.102  But he 
explained why even such a response would still leave Sixth Amendment 
principles intact: 
 
[T]he Sixth Amendment by its terms is not a limitation on 
judicial power, but a reservation of jury power.  It limits 
judicial power only to the extent that the claimed judicial 
power infringes on the province of the jury. 
Indeterminate sentencing does not do so.  It increases 
judicial discretion, to be sure, but not at the expense of 
WKHMXU\·VWUDGLWLRQDOIXQFWLRQRIILQGLQJWKHIDFWVHVVHQWLDO
to lawful imposition of the penalty.  Of course 
indeterminate schemes involve judicial factfinding, in that 
a judge (like a parole board) may implicitly rule on those 
facts he deems important to the exercise of his sentencing 
discretion.  But the facts do not pertain to whether the 
defendant has a legal right to a lesser sentence³and that 
makes all the difference insofar as judicial impingement 
upon the traditional role of the jury is concerned.103 
 
The advent of advisory Sentencing Guidelines necessarily 
increased judicial discretion at sentencing.  But it did not affect the 
principle that every jury verdict must retain some substantial meaning, 
including at least that it limits the sentence to the legal maximum for the 
offense of conviction  ,Q IDFW -XVWLFH 6FDOLD·V PDMRULW\ RSLQLRQ LQ Blakely 
suggested that a substantial jury right must include at least some version 
of the principle we argue for in this article.  Addressing critics of the 
Apprendi GHFLVLRQ KH DUJXHG WKDW WKHLU ORJLF ZRXOG KROG ´that a judge 
could sentence a man for committing murder even if the jury convicted 
him only of illegally possessing the firearm used to commit it³or of 
making an illegal lane change while fleeing the death scene.µ104  But no 
one, he claimed, perhaps with some naïveté, would actually advocate 
VXFKDQ´DEVXUGUHVXOWµ´The jury could not function as circuitbreaker in 
WKH 6WDWH·V PDFKLQHU\ RI MXVWLFH LI LW ZHUH UHOHJDWHG WR PDNLQJ D
determination that the defendant at some point did something wrong, a 
                                                 
102 Blakely, 542 U.S. at 308-09. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 306. 
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mere preliminary to a judicial inquisition into the facts of the crime the 
State actually VHHNVWRSXQLVKµ105 
 The Court has affirmed in Witte and Watts that sentences in the 
modern, federal system punish only for the offense of conviction, and 
the Court has in some respects reinvigorated the jury right in the 
Apprendi line of cases, but the Court has not yet confronted the precise 
question addressed here and the endemic in the federal system: how do 
you know when judicial fact-finding at sentencing produces legitimate 
punishment for the offense of conviction, as opposed to producing 
additional punishment³unauthorized by any jury verdict or guilty plea³
for some additional offense?  
 
 
III. IMPLEMENTATION  
 
 The simple principle that a judge can punish only for the offense 
of conviction turns out to be quite hard to implement in many cases.  It 
is tempting, for example, to apply some simple arithmetic rule, perhaps 
that facts found at sentencing cannot do more than double the sentence 
that would otherwise have applied.  But no one has come up with a 
logical basis for any particular arithmetic rule, and criminal statutes have 
long provided for very wide sentencing ranges for a reason: violators of 
any particular criminal statute can vary enormously in their culpability, 
their motives, their prior records, their demonstrated dangerousness 
going forward, and the degree of harm done³to name a few major 
considerations.  It is, therefore, very difficult to come up with a reliable 
UXOHWRFRYHUWKRVHFDVHVZKHUHLWMXVWVHHPVOLNHWKHHQKDQFHPHQWLV´WRR
ELJµ  1HYHUWKHOHVV WKHUH DUH FDVHV ZKHUH LW LV HDV\ WR LPSOHPHQW WKH
principle that courts must punish only for the offense of conviction.  If 
these simple applications are embraced, perhaps then the federal courts 
will begin to apply the principle explicitly and make progress towards 
using it in more difficult cases as well. 
 The two cases with which we began this article, United States v. 
Barber106 in the Fourth Circuit and United States v. Kelly107 in the Tenth 
Circuit, present the easy case. They asked whether a judicial finding of 
premeditation could justify a departure from the presumptive second-
degree murder range of the Guidelines.  Both courts agreed that 
SUHPHGLWDWLRQ IHOO RXWVLGH WKH FRUH RU ´KHDUWODQGµ RI VHFRQG-degree 
                                                 
105 Id. at 306-07. 
106 United States v. Barber, 119 F.3d 276 (4th Cir. 1997). 
107 United States v. Kelly, 1 F.3d 1137 (10th Cir. 1993). 
LEONARD/DIETER   FALL    2012  
284      BERKELEY  JOURNAL  OF  CRIMINAL  LAW   [Vol.  17:2    
murder.108  This conclusion seems inescapable, considering that the 
federal murder statute specifically includes premeditation as an element 
of first-degree murder and specifically defines second-degree murder as 
all murder that is not first-degree murder.109  The two courts diverged, 
however, on whether the Commission had adequately considered 
premeditation in setting the punishment range for second-degree murder.  
The Tenth Circuit concluded that the Commission had obviously 
considered premeditation, even if the Commission did not explicitly 
address it.110  At the time of the appeal, first-degree murder carried a base 
offense level of forty-three, compared to just thirty-three for second-
degree murder.111  Because only the presence or absence of premeditation 
distinguished first- and second-degree murder (in the context of that 
case), the Tenth Circuit reasoned that the Commission must have used 
premeditation to justify the ten-level disparity in punishment between 
first- and second-degree murder.112  Since the Commission had 
adequately considered premeditation in setting the sentencing range, the 
WULDOMXGJHFRXOGQRWLQFUHDVH.HOO\·VVHQWHQFHEH\RQGWKDWUDQJHXpon a 
finding of premeditation at sentencing. 
 In contrast, Fourth Circuit Judge Wilkins, who happened to be 
the former chair of the Sentencing Commission itself, disagreed strongly 
ZLWKWKH7HQWK&LUFXLW·VDQDO\VLV113  :LONLQV·VRSLQLRQODFNHGIRUPDOOHJDO 
authority, since it was written for half of an evenly divided en banc court, 
                                                 
108 Barber, 119 F.3d at 287 (Wilkins, J.);; Kelly, 1 F.3d at 1140.  The Sentencing Guidelines 
GHILQHWKLV´FRUHµDVWKH´KHDUWODQGµRIWKHRIIHQVH$FFRUGLQJWRWKH*XLGHOLQHV 
The Commission intends the sentencing courts to treat each 
JXLGHOLQH DV FDUYLQJ RXW D ´KHDUWODQGµ D VHW RI W\SLFDO FDVHV
embodying the conduct that each guideline describes.  When a court 
finds an atypical case, one to which a particular guideline linguistically 
applies but where conduct significantly differs from the norm, the 
court may consider whether a departure is warranted.  
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. 4(b) (1987).  
Under the mandatory Guidelines, and even after BookerWKH´KHDUWODQGµFRQFHSWVHUYHG
and continues to serve to anchor every sentencing proceeding in the actual offense of 
conviction by compelling judges to use as the starting point in their analysis how the 
facts of the case at issue compare to the facts of the typical conviction of that offense.  
See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007);; United States v. Christman, 607 F.3d 
1110, 1118-19 (6th Cir. 2010);; United States v. King, 604 F.3d 125, 142-43 (3d Cir. 
2010);; United States v. Martinez-Barragan, 545 F.3d 894, 900-902 (10th Cir. 2008);; 
United States v. Moreland, 437 F.3d 424, 433 (4th Cir. 2006).  
109 See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text. 
110 Kelly, 1 F.3d at 1141-42. 
111 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2A1.1 ² 2A1.2 (1993).  
112 Kelly, 1 F.3d at 1141-42. 
113 Barber, 119 F.3d at 287. 
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but it fairly represented the implicit position of most courts outside the 
7HQWK&LUFXLW$FFRUGLQJWR:LONLQVWKH&RPPLVVLRQ·VIDLOXUHWRGLVFXVV
premeditation in the context of second-degree murder meant simply and 
plainly that the Commission had not considered it when setting the base 
offense levels.114  Since premeditation fell outside the core of second-
degree murder, the trial judge could use this factor to increase the 
defeQGDQW+RGJH·VSULVRQWHUPEH\RQGWKHSUHVXPSWLYHVHQWHQFH115  The 
&RPPLVVLRQ·V LPSOLFLW ´FRQVLGHUDWLRQµ RI SUHPHGLWDWLRQ DV XQGHUVWRRG
by the Tenth Circuit, was irrelevant because the fact remained that the 
Commission had not explicitly discussed premeditation in the context of 
second-degree murder.116 
It is worth noting that even in the Fourth Circuit, half the judges 
disagreed with Wilkins and agreed with Kelly, thereby draining all legal 
DXWKRULW\ IURP :LONLQV·V RSLQLRQ EXW OHDYLQJ LQWDFW WKH WULDO FRXUW·V 
Wilkins-esque decision.  The three-judge panel that initially heard the 
Barber appeal relied heavily on Kelly and held that the trial judge could not 
use premeditation to justify an upward departure: 
 
Given the statutory definition of second-degree murder 
as murder without premeditation, the Commission 
appears to have come to the sensible, perhaps 
inescapable, conclusion that premeditation should not be 
used as an aggravator of a crime that by definition lacks 
premeditation.  To do otherwise would be to use 
sentencing mechanisms to punish defendants for crimes 
of which they have not been convicted.117 
 
The Fourth Circuit vacated this opinion upon agreeing to hear the appeal 
en banc, thus reinstating the judgment of the district court.118  But the en 
banc court ultimately divided evenly, half of its judges giving credence to 
WKH7HQWK&LUFXLW·VSRVLWLRQ 
 When the Tenth Circuit had an opportunity to reconsider its Kelly 
holding in light of the decision in Barber, it reaffirmed its position that 
                                                 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 287-88. 
116 Id. DW  ´>,@W LV REYLRXV WKDW WKH &RPPLVVLRQ ¶FRQVLGHUHG· SUHPHGLWDWLRQ LQ
establishing the homicide guidelines as a whole. It is equally clear that this fact is 
irrelevant in determining whether a departure from the second-degree murder guideline 
LVDSSURSULDWHµ 
117 United States v. Barber, 93 F.3d 1200, 1206-07 (4th Cir. 1996), UHY·GHQEDQF, 119 F.3d 
276 (4th Cir. 1997).  
118 Barber, 119 F.3d at 279 n.1 (majority opinion). 
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premeditation could not justify departure from the presumptive 
Guidelines range for second-degree murder.119  In fact, it stated the 
RSHUDWLYH SULQFLSOH HYHQPRUH EROGO\ ´>7@KH VHQWHQFLQJ FRXUWPD\ QRW
depart upward from the Guideline range for second-degree murder on 
grounds that recharacterize the offense as a first-GHJUHHPXUGHUµ120  The 
defendant in that case, Michael Lee Hanson, pled guilty to second-degree 
murder.  The evidence at sentencing, however, suggested that Hanson 
had both premeditated the murder and committed it in furtherance of a 
robbery, each a statutory element of first-degree murder.121  The 
VHQWHQFLQJMXGJHWKRXJKIUXVWUDWHGGHQLHGWKHJRYHUQPHQW·VPRWLRQIRU
GHSDUWXUHRQHLWKHUJURXQGFLWLQJWKH7HQWK&LUFXLW·VRSLQLRQLQKelly:  
 
[W]hen somebody offers somebody a plea for second 
degree, and that plea is accepted, then my ability to do 
what I think is justice in this case is limited by the 
guidelines. . . . [E]ven though I find myself in enormous 
agreement with the analysis of the heinousness and 
treachery of these acts, ,·PQR ORQJHU IUHH to simply ignore 
[the second-degree murder guideline] that existed at the 
time the plea was entered and to depart as I see fit.122 
 
7KH7HQWK&LUFXLWSDQHOWKDWKHDUGWKHDSSHDODIILUPHGWKHMXGJH·VGHQLDO
on both grounds, not only reaffirming that judges could not use 
premeditation, but also holding that judges could not increase sentences 
upon a judicial finding of felony murder because that too redefined 
second-degree murder as first-degree murder.123 As to premeditation, 
´7RDOORZXSZDUGGHSDUWXUHRQWKHJURXQGVWKDWDVHFRQG-degree murder 
was premeditated would permit the sentencing court to treat the offense 
of conviction (here, a murder that was not premeditated) as merely 
HVWDEOLVKLQJ D IORRU RIIHQVH OHYHOµ124 The panel emphasized the 
importance of maintaining the integrity of the offense of conviction and 
ZRUULHGDERXW LQFUHDVHG VHQWHQFLQJGLVSDULW\ VKRXOG MXGJHV· IDFW-finding 
turn identical convictions into different substantive crimes.125 
                                                 
119 United States v. Hanson, 264 F.3d 988, 990 (2001). 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 991. 
122 Id. at 992 (quoting Brief for Appellant, App. at 183 (No. 00-6HQWHQFLQJ+U·J
May 3, 2000)) (emphasis in original). 
123 Id. at 997. 
124 Id. at 996. 
125 Id. 
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 We find this analysis consistent with and compelled by the 
IHGHUDO FRXUWV· UHVSRQVLELOLW\ WR GHIHQG WKH LQWHJULW\ RI WKH 6L[WK
Amendment jury right and the Fifth Amendment protection against 
GRXEOHMHRSDUG\WKH65$·VLQVLVWHQFHRQXQLIRUPLW\DQGSURSRUWLRQDOLW\
DQG WKH *XLGHOLQHV· FRQVHTXHQW UHMHFWLRQ RI ´UHDO RIIHQVHµ VHQWHQFLQJ
When Congress passed the federal murder statute, it enacted a graded 
offense structure, one that clearly distinguished between first- and 
second-degree murder and created two distinct offenses.  In similar 
IDVKLRQ WKH6HQWHQFLQJ*XLGHOLQHV FDUYHRXW D´KHDUWODQGµ IRU VHFRQG-
degree murder,126 but this heartland does not exist in isolation, as the 
)RXUWK&LUFXLW SURSRVHG  ,W LV ERXQGHG E\ WKH*XLGHOLQHV· VHQWHQFLQJ
rules for related offenses. The Sentencing Commission must, of course, 
ZULWHWKH*XLGHOLQHVZLWKGXHUHVSHFWIRU&RQJUHVV·VVWDWXWRU\JUDGLQJRI
offenses, and judges must then read the Guidelines in light of that 
statutorily mandated grading structure.  As clearly as premeditation falls 
outside the typical second-degree murder, it just as clearly falls within the 
typical first-degree murder.  Finding premeditation in a second-degree 
murder, then, does more than contextualize the nature of the offense: it 
redefines the conduct as a typical first-degree murder, punishing the 
defendant for a crime other than the offense of conviction.  Such a 
GHWHUPLQDWLRQ YLRODWHV WKH 6XSUHPH &RXUW·V ORQJVWDQGLQJ GLUHFWLYH WKDW
courts punish only for the offense of conviction.127  
Thus, at a minimum, federal courts should hold that a sentence 
for one offense cannot be enhanced by factual findings that redefine the 
offense, that render the enhancement a punishment for some offense 
different from the offense of conviction. Acknowledging that, in many 
cases, it will be hard to draw the line that best reflects this principle, the 
courts should at least begin by declaring a legal rule that a sentence for 
second-degree murder in the federal system cannot be enhanced by a 
finding of premeditation or a finding that the murder happeQHG´LQWKH
SHUSHWUDWLRQRIµRQHRI WKHPXUGHU VWDWXWH·V HQXPHUDWHG IHORQLHV128  A 
                                                 
126 See, supra note 108. 
127 See, supra Part III.B. 
128 18 U.S.C. 1111(a) (2006):  
Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice 
aforethought. Every murder perpetrated by poison, lying in wait, or 
any other kind of willful, deliberate, malicious, and premeditated 
killing;; or committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, 
any arson, escape, murder, kidnapping, treason, espionage, sabotage, 
aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse, child abuse, burglary, or 
robbery;; or perpetrated as part of a pattern or practice of assault or 
torture against a child or children;; or perpetrated from a 
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sentencing judge should not be able to recharacterize second-degree 
murder as first-degree murder to justify an enhanced sentence beyond 
the presumptive, albeit advisory,129 Guidelines range.  To allow otherwise 
reintroduces the element of lawlessness that was to be cured by the 
modern requirement that judges exercise their discretion only on the 
basis of explicit factual findings that are rationally connected to the 
offense of conviction. 
 
 
IV. BEYOND   SECOND-­‐DEGREE   MURDER:   APPLYING   THE  
PRINCIPLE  TO  OTHER  OFFENSES  
 
 Although this article focuses most concretely on premeditation in 
second-degree murder cases, the limiting principle espoused could and 
should receive broader application FRQVLVWHQWZLWK WKH6XSUHPH&RXUW·V
sentencing jurisprudence.  As the circumstances and facts of an 
individual case become more complex, the principle necessarily loses its 
bright-line quality.  Nevertheless, the key tenet still stands.  The 
conviction must provide a meaningful link between offense and 
punishment, and judges should not have authority to redefine the 
offense. 
 First, we want to consider a case that is different from the 
premeditation cases but nearly as easy doctrinally, even as its terrifying 
facts tempt one to depart from principle. In this 2007 case, United States v. 
Allen, the Tenth Circuit again cemented its lonely leadership among the 
federal circuits by insisting on the principle that we have outlined in this 
article, both as a matter of proper interpretation of the Guidelines and as 
a Sixth Amendment matter.130  In this case, the authorities had 
information that Leroy Eric Allen was seriously contemplating the 
horrific crimes of raping, murdering, and perhaps torturing young girls.131  
They had gathered enough evidence to suggest that Allen might be 
                                                                                                                   
premeditated design unlawfully and maliciously to effect the death of 
any human being other than him who is killed, is murder in the first 
degree. 
Any other murder is murder in the second degree. 
129 Although the Guidelines are now advisory, the judge is still required to justify any 
variance from the recommended Guidelines range.  Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 
351 (2007).  The appellate courts, therefore, retain the power to invalidate sentences 
that rest on factual findings and reasoning that redefines the offense of conviction as 
some other offense.  
130 See United States v. Allen, 488 F.3d 1244 (10th Cir. 2007). 
131 Id. at 1246-47. 
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prepared to carry through on his declared intentions but not enough to 
actually prosecute him for an attempt.  In the end, they decided to take 
advantage of his concurrent involvement with drugs to set him up on a 
charge of methamphetamine distribution.132 This proved the successful 
avenue, and the Government ultimately convicted Allen on the drug 
charge.133  The prosecution predictably sought to prove at sentencing that 
Allen represented a serious danger to young girls in the future.  The trial 
judge, suitably horrified by the evidence to this effect, embraced the 
*RYHUQPHQW·VSRVLWLRQDQGHQKDQFHG$OOHQ·VRWKHUZLVHOLNHO\VHQWHQFHRI
about twelve years to a full thirty years on the basis of his 
dangerousness.134  
 The Tenth Circuit, however, adhered stoutly to principles of law 
LQGHQ\LQJWKH86$WWRUQH\·VRIILFH LWVGHVLUHGVKRUWFXW ,W LQVLVWHGRQ
ZKDW LW FDOOHG WKH ´UHODWHGQHVV SULQFLSOHµ³that is, that sentencing facts 
must be adequately related to the offense of conviction³which it located 
firmly in the Guidelines and the SRA, citing even Chairman/Judge 
Wilkins in support: 
 
The relatedness principle is fundamental because 
of our commitment to sentencing based on the 
seriousness of the actual offense proven or admitted. See 18 
86&D ¶¶WKHQDWXUH DQGFLUFXPVWDQFHV of the 
offense·· HPSKDVLV DGGHG id.  D$ ¶¶WKH QHHG
for the sentence imposed . . . to reflect the seriousness of 
the offense   ··HPSKDVLVDGGHG:illiam W. Wilkins, Jr. 
& John R. Steer, Relevant Conduct: The Cornerstone of the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 41 S.C. L. Rev. 495, 497²99 
(1990).135 
 
0RUHRYHU-XGJH0F&RQQHOO·VFRPSHOOLQJRSLQLRQUHFRJQL]LQJWKDWDIWHU
Booker, he could not rely solely on the Guidelines to control sentencing in 
the trial courts, located the relatedness principle in the Sixth Amendment 
as well: 
 
This is not unrelated to the Sixth Amendment principles 
underlying Booker. . . . When a sentencing court considers 
conduct related to the offense of conviction, the 
                                                 
132 Id. at 1248. 
133 Id. at 1248-49. 
134 Id. at 1249-52. 
135 Id. at 1255.  
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objective is to determine the seriousness of the very 
crime found by the jury or admitted by the defendant.  If 
the considered conduct has nothing to do with the 
offense of conviction, the court is effectively sentencing a 
defendant for a crime that was never proved to the jury, 
or admitted by the defendant.  To allow this would 
empower the government to obtain punishment for any 
number of unrelated crimes, based on bench trial rather 
than jury trial.  The relatedness principle thus keeps the 
system from straying too far beyond the Sixth 
Amendment line.136 
 
Just as in the second-degree murder cases, therefore, but now reaching 
RXW WR RWKHU FRQWH[WV WKH 7HQWK &LUFXLW KHOG $OOHQ·V VHQWHQFH
unreasonable because of the irrelevance to the drug conviction of the 
VHQWHQFLQJIDFWVUHJDUGLQJ$OOHQ·VSURSHQVLW\WRVH[XDOYLROHQFH 
 Aside from these Tenth Circuit cases and Barber in the Fourth 
Circuit, few cases have openly confronted such stark examples of 
punishment for facts other than the offense of conviction,137 even 
though it seems clear that such cases exist.  More typical is a troubling 
but ambiguous case like United States v. Paster138 from the Third Circuit. 
Mitchell Frederick Paster was convicted of second-degree murder.  The 
sHQWHQFLQJ MXGJH PRYHG 3DVWHU·V VHQWHQFH IURP D SUHVXPSWLYH
Guidelines sentence of about ten or eleven years to more than thirty 
\HDUVRQWKHEDVLVRI´H[WUHPHFRQGXFW139³LQWKLVFDVH3DVWHU·VLQIOLFWLRQ
of at least sixteen stab wounds on his wife.140  In doing so, the judge 
sentenced Paster in a range that might have applied if he had been 
convicted of first-degree murder, rather than pleading to second-degree 
                                                 
136 Id.  We think the only reasonable reading of Allen is that a departure from the 
´UHODWHGQHVVSULQFLSOHµLVDYLRODWLRQRIWKH6L[WK$PHQGPHQWHYHQWKRXJKWKHRSLQLRQ
is less than explicit in summarizing the holding.  See id. DW´In a case involving a 
variance of this magnitude, we hold that, whatever latitude a sentencing court may have 
WRDGMXVWDGHIHQGDQW·VVHQWHQFH LQDQH[HUFLVHRIBooker discretion, it may not discard 
the advisory Guideline range and impose sentence, instead, on the basis of evidence of 
WKH GHIHQGDQW·V XQFKDUJHG XQUHODWHG PLVconduct, whether actually committed or 
FRQWHPSODWHGIRUWKHIXWXUHµ. 
137 See, e.g., United States v. Newsom, 508 F.3d 731, 734 (5th Cir. 2007);; United States v. 
Ortiz, 431 F.3d 1035, 1040-41 (7th Cir. 2005);; United States v. Leonard, 289 F.3d 984, 
987-89 (7th Cir. 2002);; United States v. Cross, 121 F.3d 234 (6th Cir. 1997);; United 
States v. Kim, 896 F.2d 678, 682-84 (2d Cir. 1990). 
138 United States v. Paster, 173 F.3d 206 (3d Cir. 1999). 
139 Id. at 216. 
140 Id. at 209-10. 
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murder.  Although the sentencing judge had not flouted any clear rule, 
the way the Tenth Circuit determined that the Kelly sentencing judge had, 
the Third Circuit nevertheless saw a similar dynamic at play: 
 
The vice of the nine-level upward departure imposed on 
Paster is that he has incurred for second degree murder a 
sentence that would be appropriate for first degree 
murder . . . . Thus, if the government had required Paster 
to plead guilty to first degree murder in order to escape 
the death penalty, . . . he would have faced a sentence in 
the range of 324-405 months, the median of which is the 
actual sentence that Paster received. This lack of disparity 
between Paster's actual sentence and one he could have 
received had he pleaded guilty to, or been convicted of, a 
more serious crime distorts proportionality, a critical 
objective of the Sentencing Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. Ch. 
1, Pt. A, 3.141 
 
In our view, the reversal in Paster is a reasonable application of 
the principle we are defending: that judges must sentence only for the 
offense of conviction and have no authority to redefine that offense for 
sentencing purposes.142  But it is nevertheless a problematic application.  
That is, it is not at all clear that a particularly heinous second-degree 
murder should never be punished at a level that might overlap with some 
first-degree murders.  Legislatures grade offenses for important reasons, 
but they do their grading imperfectly.  Available punishments for first- 
                                                 
141 Id. at 220-21 (citations omitted). 
142 Note that, much like the Paster FRXUWZKLFKXVHGWKHODQJXDJHRI´SURSRUWLRQDOLW\µ
the editor of Federal Sentencing Law & Practice found that the principle of avoiding 
´XQZDUUDQWHGGLVSDULW\µMXVWLILHGWKH7HQWK&LUFXLW·VSRVLWLRQLQKelly:  
The Tenth Circuit has the stronger position.  If a court can depart 
upward based on a factor that differentiates the chapter two offense 
guidelines (such as premeditation in a second-degree murder case), 
WKHQWKH&RPPLVVLRQ·VFRQYLFWLRQ-offense/real-offense compromise 
is negated.  Under the rationale of the separate opinion in the Fourth 
Circuit case, the guidelines would have a floor based on the 
conviction offense, but each sentencing court could depart upward 
EDVHGXSRQWKH¶UHDORIIHQVH·ZKHQHYHUWKHFRurt wished.  This hardly 
seems consistent with the goal³established by Congress and 
subscribed to by the Commission³of reducing unwarranted 
sentencing disparity.  
THOMAS W. HUTCHISON ET AL., FEDERAL SENTENCING LAW AND PRACTICE § 2A1.2 
cmt. 2(f) (2012 ed.). 
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and second-degree murders, like available punishments for so many 
offenses, overlap with each other quite a bit.  And there is no reason to 
think that legislatures have fully defined the criteria of criminal grading 
when they have established the elements of all offenses, not as long as 
the legislatures and courts remain committed to wide sentencing ranges 
and substantial fact-finding at sentencing.  The fact is that strict, formal 
grading of offenses coexists³in some tension, at times³with relatively 
loose sentencing practices amid overlapping statutory ranges.  It is 
SODXVLEOHWRWKLQNWKDW3DVWHU·VVHFRQG-degree murder was punishable at a 
level that overlapped with the available range for first-degree murder in 
WKLVFDVHEHFDXVH LWZDVFRPPLWWHG LQDSDUWLFXODUO\´H[WUHPHµZD\ 6R
the holding in Paster is, as we say, problematic.  It is neither logically 
compelled nor logically prevented by any available principle.  
 The Paster holding is nevertheless a plausible, pragmatic effort to 
employ appellate judicial power to incrementally enhance the rationality 
of grading and punishment in the modern, legalized era of sentencing.  
Although Congress has fastened on premeditation and an accompanying 
felony as the only elements that make for first-degree murder at the 
conviction stage, a court can make efforts to reinforce the grading 
structure in other respects at sentencing.  That is, it might, as the Third 
Circuit effectively did in Paster, establish a strong presumption that no 
sentencing aggravator should enhance a second-degree sentence into the 
same range that presumptively applies to first-degree murder.  Such a 
rule would contain real elements of arbitrariness, but it would represent a 
readily intelligible effort to give appellate review and the sentencing 
system as a whole a more predictable and legal character.  
 Another difficult category of cases arises from what might be 
internal contradictions within the Guidelines.  Although we think the 
Guidelines declare a basic commitment to punishing only for the offense 
of conviction, particular guidelines arguably violate this principle.  A 
2009 case from the Fourth Circuit offers an example.143 A jury convicted 
Gary Williams on two counts of cocaine distribution and one count of 
distributing fifty grams or more of cocaine base.144  At sentencing, 
however, the judge found Williams responsible for the first-degree 
murder of an intended prosecution witness.145  The judge then followed 
the command of the guideline applicable to those convicted of drug 
offenses,146 which required that the judge cross-reference the first-degree 
                                                 
143 8QLWHG6WDWHVY:LOOLDPV)$SS·[WK&LU 
144 Id. at 913. 
145 Id. 
146 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(d)(1) (2011). 
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murder guideline and sentence the defendant according to that latter 
guideline, not the one normally applicable to the distribution 
convictions.147  7KH)RXUWK&LUFXLW DIILUPHG:LOOLDPV·V OLIH VHQWHQFHRQ
DSSHDO UHMHFWLQJ WKH GHIHQGDQW·V FODLP WKDW JLYHQ WKH VL]H RI WKH
sentencing enhancement,148 the trial judge should have found the 
sentencing facts by a heightened standard of proof.149 
 The principle espoused in this article would have provided the 
defendant with a strong argument that the judge imposed an 
unreasonable and thus illegal sentence because he redefined the drug 
offense as some other offense, first-degree murder, for which there was 
no conviction.  Indeed, one could argue that a sentence is illegitimate any 
time the Guidelines call for a judge to cross-reference a guideline for a 
separate, unconvicted offense in the way the Williams judge did, 
calculating the sentence ultimately without reference to the offense of 
conviction at all but entirely on the basis of an offense found for the first 
time at sentencing.  This argument would not imply that the judge should 
LJQRUHDILQGLQJWKDWWKHGHIHQGDQWFDXVHGWKHZLWQHVV·VGHDth.  Clearly, a 
drug crime involving a death deserves more serious punishment than a 
less harmful drug crime;; it nonetheless deserves to be punished as a drug 
crime, not a murder.  The Williams judge did not simply enhance 
punishment, but rather sentenced the defendant as if he had been 
indicted, tried, and convicted of first-degree murder.150  
(YHQPRUH LPSRUWDQWO\ WKH MXGJH·V ZULWWHQ DQDO\VLV WUHDWHG WKH
drug offense as irrelevant to the sentence once the murder was brought 
to light.  Nothing indicated that the punishment reflected appropriate 
contextualization of the drug offense;; everything in the analysis 
suggested that the defendant was punished for murder, despite the 
absence of a conviction for that offense.151  The Tenth Circuit has 
succinctly described the vice in such a sentencing: 
                                                 
147 United States v. Williams, No. WDQ-07-0402, 2008 WL 2091152, at * 4-5 (D. Md. 
May 16, 2008). 
148 The case report does not specify what the sentence would have been without the 
ILQGLQJ RI PXUGHU EXW WKH MXGJH·V VHQWHQFLQJ PHPRUDQGXP GRHV QRWH WKDW ´7KH
presentence report calculates for Williams a base offense level of 30 and a criminal 
history category of VI.  The corresponding advisory Guidelines range is 168-210 
PRQWKVµId. at *4 n.4. 
149 Williams)$SS·[DW 
150 Note that in rare cases a federal murder defendant might possibly be sentenced to 
death.  See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591-99 (2006 & Supp. II 2008). 
151 7KH MXGJH·VVHQWHQFLQJPHPRUDQGXPUHOLHVRQ WKHGUXJFRQYLFWLRQVRQO\ WR MXVWLI\
the use of the relaxed procedures of a sentencing hearing in finding Williams 
responsible for a first-GHJUHHPXUGHU7KDW LV KHEUXVKHGRII:LOOLDPV·V Rbjection to 
being, in effect, tried for murder without any trial rights by noting that Williams had 
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 If the government, federal or state, believes [the 
defendant] committed a crime in his dealings [which did 
not form the basis of the current conviction] . . . , it is 
free to bring a prosecution for that conduct. In such a 
proceeding, [the defendant] would be entitled to put the 
government to its proof.  Despite the wide latitude Booker 
granted district courts, we do not believe it sanctions an 
end-run around this fundamental process.152 
 
 Use of the first-degree murder guideline should have alerted the 
trial court that it was on dangerous ground, that it risked crossing the line 
from enhancing punishment to redefining the offense of conviction.  
Instead, the court uncritically applied the murder guideline, allowing the 
oIIHQVH RI FRQYLFWLRQ WR SURYLGH DPHUH ´IORRUµ IURPZKLFK WKH FRXUW
rapidly built the sentence upward.153  To sentence as the Williams court 
did would seem to redefine the offense of conviction and violate the 
Sixth Amendment jury right. 
 One last example will introduce a much harder class of cases, one 
that we do not attempt to handle in this article.  In run-of-the-mill drug 
cases, sentence length is determined largely by the type and quantity of 
the drug involved.  These cases often involve several counts of drug 
possession, distribution, and/or conspiracy.  It is not uncommon for 
juries to acquit on one or more counts or for a plea bargain to knock out 
one or more charges, only to have the sentencing judge find that the 
offender was indeed responsible for all of the drugs underlying all of the 
charges.  In such a case, the Guidelines will often call on the judge to 
sentence the offender exactly as if she or he had been convicted on all 
charges, rather than one or two, and the judge will often comply. Such a 
SURFHHGLQJ ORRNV OLNH WKH FRXUW·V VHL]LQJ RQ RQH FRQYLFWLRQ DV D PHUH
technical device that allows it to punish primarily for other, unconvicted 
offenses.  But, again, there may be arguments that justify what first 
appear to be illogical sentences in terms of the principles of the 
Guidelines, the SRA, and the Sixth Amendment.  And, even if no 
argument can adequately justify identical sentences for meaningfully 
different convictions, it will be extremely difficult to determine exactly 
                                                                                                                   
already been convicted at trial for the drug offense and therefore no longer had the 
rights of an unconvicted person.  With that business out of the way, the judge then 
focused entirely on the murder and the guideline for first-degree murder in coming to a 
sentence. Williams, 2008 WL 2091152, at *4-5. 
152 United States v. Allen, 488 F.3d 1244, 1261 (10th Cir. 2007). 
153 See HUTCHISON ET AL., supra note 142. 
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how much of a discount one offender should get when convicted of only 
some charges, relative to a co-conspirator who is convicted of all charges.  
We thus leave for another day the challenge of figuring out exactly where 
the line is in such cases between appropriate contextualization at 
sentencing and illegitimate punishment for unconvicted offenses. 
 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
 This article recognizes that in the current federal sentencing 
system, there is no ready way to eliminate the tension between the 
conviction stage of our criminal process and the sentencing stage.  At the 
conviction stage, offenses have relatively simple definitions and a 
defendant, presumed innocent, can rely on a number of constitutional 
rights that make conviction difficult.  After conviction, however, our 
system insists that substantial additional fact-finding is essential to 
properly contextualize the offense of conviction and produce a just and 
effective sentence within typically vast statutory sentencing ranges.  This 
fact-finding may bring along some constitutional protections for the 
offender.  But our system firmly rejects any claim to the full procedural 
rights of trial since the defendant has already been convicted and the 
remaining task is merely to judge the context of the offense for 
sentencing purposes.  This disjunction between the trial and sentencing 
stages has permitted routine imposition of sentences that punish 
defendants for offenses of which the offender was never convicted.  
What can be done about that short of insisting on full trial rights for 
every sentencing fact? 
 We are sympathetic to arguments for increased procedural 
protections at sentencing, although scholarship that has argued for the 
entire elimination of acquitted or unconvicted conduct has seemed to us 
one-dimensional and unrealistic.  We offer a different approach that 
recognizes the legitimacy of the use of unconvicted conduct at 
sentencing when properly disciplined.  That practice can be disciplined if 
the courts develop rules that exclude from sentencing discrete kinds of 
fact-finding and reasoning that clearly circumvent the imperative that a 
defendant must be punished only for the offense of conviction. 
 This article makes clear why one such rule would exclude a 
finding of premeditation or of an underlying felony in a federal 
sentencing for second-degree murder.  Judges should not have authority 
to make such findings and thus punish a second-degree murderer as if 
she or he was a first-degree murderer.  To do so denigrates the role of 
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conviction in the criminal process and runs counter to the purpose and 
structure of the Sentencing Guidelines, the Sentencing Reform Act, and 
WKH6XSUHPH&RXUW·VUHFHQWFRQVWLWXWLRQDOFDVHVRQGRXEOHMHRSDUG\DQG
the jury right.  This article also begins to explain what other related rules 
for disciplining punishment might look like, even as it embraces 
significant judicial fact-finding and discretion at sentencing.  In the end, 
though, we rely on the idea that firm adoption of a few readily available 
rules will vindicate and entrench a principle³no sentencing for 
unconvicted offenses³that the Court has quietly articulated but never 
fully developed.  Only when that principle is made operative and reliable 
in the clearest cases will courts and scholars be in a position to work out 
the full contours of the rules in harder cases. 
 
